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“The Source of
Change Within
Society”: A
Brief Survey of
Modern Iranian
Women’s
Movements

4

and Islamist discourse to further their
political goals for equal rights. In this paper
I examine the 1890 Tobacco Boycott and
Constitutional Revolution, the 1936
unveiling law, 1963 White Revolution, and
1979 Islamic Revolution to present a brief
history of women’s movements in Iran, trace
the changing forms of discourse, and
demonstrate how the Islamic Revolution
opened the doors for Iranian women to
develop an indigenous feminism that could
not be characterized as immoral, dangerous,
or Western.

ANDRE VOGEL

The politics of gender have dominated

Abstract
The politics of gender have dominated
Western conversation concerning Iran since
the Islamic Republic’s founding more than
three decades ago. Often, this conversation
centers on the veil and other aspects of
Iranian women’s dress as a symbol of
Iranian women’s inability for self-advocacy.
Women, though, occupy a rich space in
modern Iranian history. Beginning with the
Tobacco Boycott of 1890 and ensuing
Constitutional Revolution, following to the
1936 unveiling law and the 1963 White
Revolution, women’s rights were central to
the Pahlavi regime’s modernization plans.
These plans utilized a Western, humanist
discourse that proved inimical to the
fulfillment of women’s participation in the
public sphere and presented female
enfranchisement as immoral and dangerous
to Iranian society. The time following the
1979 Islamic Revolution opened doors to
women’s activists to make use of Islamic

Western conversation concerning Iran since
the Islamic Republic’s founding more than
three decades ago. In the West, one regularly
discovers articles 1 lamenting the apparent
slide backwards that the Islamic Republic has
taken with regards to women’s rights.
Certainly, contemporary life for Iranian
women is problematic. However, as Lila
Abu-Lughod has noted, obsessive focus on
the symbolic markers of women’s oppression
(often clothing) in the Middle East tends to
lead one into an Orientalist and essentialist
trap that wipes away any understanding of
Iranian women’s agency in their own lives:
“Is it not a gross violation of women's own
understandings of what they are doing to
simply denounce the burqa as a medieval
imposition?”2
In reality, Iranian women, from the
early twentieth century to the years following
the 1979 revolution, have interacted with
state and society in varied, complex ways,
sometimes successfully and sometimes
unsuccessfully, in an attempt to achieve
gender equality. In this paper I will examine
the history of women’s movements in Iran. I

1

2
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Abug-Lughod, 785

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2018

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol2/iss4/1

4

et al.: Full Issue

will first focus on pre-revolutionary history.
Through the lens of three major events: the
Tobacco Boycott and Constitutional
Revolution, Reza Shah’s 1936 unveiling law,
and Mohammed Reza Shah’s 1963 White
Revolution, I will demonstrate how the use of
a Western, secular, humanist discourse
surrounding female emancipation both failed
to provide legitimate gender equality and
served to reinforce clerical and traditional
views of women’s emancipation as
dangerous to the fabric of Iranian society. I
will then examine the Islamic revolution and
its aftermaths. Specifically, I will show that
Islamist revolutionaries moralized women’s
political participation in the public sphere
and thus allowed Islamist women, in the
decades following the revolution, to develop
an emancipatory framework that is founded
in a feminist exegesis of the Quran; what is
known as Islamic feminism.
The history of modern women’s
action in Iran begins with the Tobacco
Boycott of 1890 and ensuing Constitutional
Revolution. In both cases women proved
invaluable, lending concrete physical support
to the boycott and the constitutional
movement. Unfortunately, the Constitutional
Revolution also marked the beginning of a
construction, in the Iranian national
consciousness,
of
both
women’s
emancipation
and
female
political
participation as immoral, corrupting, and
Western. This construction was further
reinforced during the Pahlavi dynasty, when
programs of rapid modernization and
Westernization, in which the appearance of
gender equality was considered critical, were
instituted.
The Pahlavis introduced two legal
packages, the 1936 unveiling law and 1963
White Revolution, which, superficially,
attempted to allow space for women to
integrate into, and engage with, the public
political sphere. Ultimately, though, the laws

5

3

failed to achieve their stated aim. Women’s
emancipation, as a component of the Pahlavis’
plan for Westernization and modernization,
was derided as immoral and dangerous to
Iranian society. The problem, as I identify in
this paper, was primarily discursive: the
Pahlavi dynasty and those women activists
who worked within its institutional confines
made use of a modern, Western mode of
discourse, which could not adequately
challenge the traditional, Islamic discourse of
the clerical establishment and those who
opposed women’s emancipation. This
changed quite drastically during the 1979
Islamic Revolution.
The revolution, in which female
revolutionaries were lionized by the highest
religious figures, opened the doors of Islamic
discourse to women; especially with regards
to women’s rights and female emancipation.
Certain women, after the revolution, made
use of the new, Islamic mode of discourse to
push for and develop what some scholars
have called Islamic Feminism, that is: “a
feminist discourse and practice articulated
within an Islamic Paradigm.” 3 They have
made use of classic, Islamic, theological tools,
such as ijtihad, or interpretation, to
reinterpret and reclaim Islam and Quranic
verses as feminist.
From the Tobacco Boycott of 1890
until the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iranian
women on the front lines of progressive
social and political movements aimed at
securing gender equality and developing a
feminist consciousness. These movements
took the form of mass protests, in the case of
the Tobacco Boycott and Constitutional
Revolution or top-down political action, in
the case of the 1936 unveiling laws and 1963
White Revolution. These movements,
whether broad-based or top-down, attempted
to institute a secular, humanist, and, most
importantly, Western interpretation of gender
equality. Unfortunately, the use of a Western,

Ahmadi, 35
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secular, humanist discourse surrounding
female emancipation both failed to provide
legitimate gender equality and served to
reinforce clerical and traditionalist views of
women’s emancipation as dangerous to the
very fabric of Iranian society.
Several of the ideas outlined above
are rather slippery and, for the purposes of
this paper, will require more nuanced and indepth definitions, namely: my delineation of
legitimate equality and the broader idea of a
Western, secular, feminist politics. First, I
consider a legitimate policy of gender
equality to be one that is both legal (i.e.
enshrined in law) and reflected, or visible,
within broader society. Thus, a movement
which advocates for gender equality and
which may be supported by a majority of
people is illegitimate if it does not rest on a
political and legal foundation of equality; that
is, if legal code does not support gender
equality. Conversely, if a legal and political
movement is not supported in society at large,
it too is illegitimate. This is not meant as a
critique of attempts to build gender equality
either through law or through social
movements; rather, as will shortly become
clear, it is a necessary definition in
understanding the history and development
of feminist consciousness in Iran.
Secondly, a Western, secular feminist
discourse is one that takes a humanist
approach in justifying female empowerment
and gender equality. This approach takes as
self-evident that women and men deserve
equal treatment and are equally capable of
participating in society; it was forcefully
articulated by Zayneb Pasha, a female leader
in the Tobacco Boycott of 1890: “If you men
do not have the courage to punish the
oppressors…wear our veil and go home. Do
not claim to be men; we will fight instead of
you.” 4 That is, if men are unable to

accomplish the necessary goals of fighting
tyranny they should allow women to take
charge because women are equally capable;
men and women are intrinsically equal.
Returning to Iran, in 1890 the Shah of
Iran at the time, Nasser al-Din, granted a
concession over all Iranian tobacco to Great
Britain, which led to widespread protests that
cut across social, class, and gender lines
within the country. Despite attempts to keep
them a secret, word of the concessions got out
to the general public and, supported in part by
edicts from clergy and leaders outside Iran, a
broad swath of the Iranian public took to the
streets in protest. The protests were
unprecedented but not unexpected: Western
business had been encroaching into the
Iranian economy for some time. While these
encroachments
sometimes
brought
prosperity to Iranian businessmen, they more
often transformed traditional economic
structures and ruined native industries. 5
Quite naturally, then, Western intrusion into
the Iranian economic sphere was met with
anger and resentment, which quickly evolved
into a broader rejection of Western
philosophical and social values, including
women’s emancipation.
Women played a key role in the
Tobacco protests; when the protests first
erupted, women immediately joined in,
marching in organized lines at the front of the
crowds. 6 As the protests evolved into a
general boycott on the consumption and sale
of tobacco, women’s groups, known as
anjomans, turned militant. They armed
themselves with “rifles, clubs, and bags full
of rocks, hidden under their black chadors 7
and attacked merchants and soldiers who
refused to support the boycott. Surprisingly,
even the Shah’s wives “stood in solidarity
with ordinary Iranians in boycotting
tobacco.” 8 Faced with opposition from all

4
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sides of society, the Shah had little choice but
to cancel the tobacco concession—Iranians
and, especially Iranian women, had been
successful. In leading protests and in
militantly upholding the boycott, Iranian
women recognized the power they held to
effect change. The Iranian women on the
front lines of the Tobacco Boycott
represented a burgeoning understanding of
women’s social and political strength; a
growth in feminist consciousness in Iran.
Understandably, women soon acted upon this
consciousness to advocate for domestic
political change during the Constitutional
Revolution of 1905-1911.
With the success of the Tobacco
Boycott grew a greater nationalist and antiimperialist sentiment, culminating in the
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911.
Women, once again, fought on the front lines.
Initially, as with the Tobacco Boycott,
anjomans joined forces with members of
disparate social classes to push for the
general goals of constitutionalism, checks
and balances, and an Iranian society free of
despotism. As the revolution proceeded,
though, militant anjomans, reminiscent of
those in of the Tobacco Boycott, took up
arms in support of the movement. Some
“took up clubs and acted as bodyguards” 9 for
prominent clergy members who supported
the constitution, while others went so far as
to enter government buildings with revolvers
and threaten to “kill their own husbands and
sons and leave behind their own dead
bodies” 10 if constitutionalism was not
enacted. As in the Tobacco Boycotts, the
Shah was forced to concede: in 1906, a
constitution was drafted that severely
curtailed the monarch’s power. It would seem
that women had again successfully
demonstrated their collective ability to enact
political change. Unfortunately, while

women who had fought and died for the
constitutionalist cause were honored as
“martyrs of freedom,”11 female participation
in the revolution was not materially rewarded:
the constitution “completely ignored and
omitted rights for women;” 12 they were
barred from voting, from running for office,
and even from acquiring education.
Constitutionalist women were incensed:
women “did not take part in the Revolution
to have their rights trampled upon.”13
Despite their anger, in the years
following the revolution, as disagreements
over constitutionalism and the future of the
country evolved into an outright civil war,
women remained explicitly nationalist and
constitutionalist.
Women
financed,
supported, and again took up arms for the
constitutionalist cause, for the most part
without crossing into expressly emancipatory
territory. Those who did practice an
emancipatory politics, who advocated for the
radical ideals of women’s education,
women’s suffrage, or release from veiling
laws, were castigated. In one particularly
memorable moment, a group of women took
to the streets of Tehran shouting proconstitutional slogans and removing their
chadors. Their actions immediately resulted
in public indignation: the anti-veil protestors
were
condemned,
even
by
other
constitutionalist women; their actions
derided as those of “a bunch of prostitutes. 14
Thus, while women were celebrated as
“martyrs of freedom” while strictly fighting
for a patriarchal constitution, they were
castigated, pilloried as immoral prostitutes,
and dismissed the moment they began to
advocate for a personal emancipation.
The failure of the Constitutional
Revolution to achieve legitimate gender
equality was primarily one of differing
discourses: radical anjomans had pushed for

9
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equality through humanist arguments, by
declaring that women were intrinsically able
to “correct the law… and appoint
governors… [and] destroy the roots of
tyranny and oppression” 15 , but opposition
relied on religious and Islamic arguments to
outline the impossibility of such equality.
Arguments against women’s rights were
presented by clerics who argued that “God
had not given them [women] the capacity
needed for taking part in politics.” 16 In the
cultural and discursive environment of the
time, defined by a growing distrust of all
Western ideals due to Western economic
disruption in the previous decades, the
traditional, religious argument was stronger
than the humanist one: women’s place in
Iranian society was ordained by God himself.
The Constitutional Revolution and its
aftermath demonstrated the inadequacy of
humanist approaches to achieving gender
equality in Iran; there was simply no way to
develop a broad-based, modern, secular
movement for women’s rights in the face of
popular opposition that viewed female
emancipators
as
“prostitutes”;
that
considered all emancipatory action the result
of a “conspiracy of ‘morally corrupt’
Westernized intellectuals”17, as one cleric put
it, to destroy Iranian society. Despite this
failure, future emancipatory action remained
situated within a Western, secular discourse.
However, further attempts, as in 1936, to
develop women’s emancipation within such
a Western discourse were resoundingly
rejected by the traditional and clerical classes.
In 1936, Reza Shah unilaterally
banned the use of the veil. The ban was
delivered as part of a broader push towards a
Western modernity, as such the policy failed
to secure legitimate female emancipation and,

in fact, isolated a large segment of Iranian
women from society while further
constructing women’s emancipation as
Western and immoral.
From the outset of his rule, Reza
Shah maintained a strict policy of nation
building and modernization that was built on
a specific conception of modernity that held
as paramount the “imitation of certain aspects
of Western societies.” 18 To that end, taxes
were imposed, railroads and factories were
built, and the military was greatly expanded.
With regards to women, the Shah believed
the visible entrance of women into the public
sphere was “a hallmark of modernization.”19
Following a trip to Turkey in the early 1930s,
where Ataturk had already banned hijab, the
Shah unilaterally barred the use of the veil
among Iranian women and ordered them to
dress in “Western-style clothing.” 20 The
policy was militantly enforced: women who
ventured outside wearing a veil were liable to
be attacked and forcibly disrobed by police. 21
While the policy could be construed
as an attempt to emancipate women, this was
belied by the Shah’s decision to, at the time
of the law’s passage, dismantle all
independent
women’s
organizations,
women’s
magazines,
and
women’s
newspapers that existed in Iran. 22 The
unveiling policy was enacted strictly to force
a rapid Westernization of Iran, not
emancipate women. Although the Shah’s
new policy was supported by some middle
and upper-class women, leaving the house
unveiled was, for the many lower-class and
religious women who had been socialized to
accept the veil as natural, akin to going out
naked. 23 Facing state violence if they
disobeyed, following Reza Shah’s decree
many of these religious women simply

15

20

16

21

Derayeh, 115
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refused to leave their homes. While the
Shah’s unveiling policy was, in theory, aimed
at drawing women visibly into the public
sphere, in practice it did the exact opposite.
Furthermore, the law underscored and
reinforced the general feeling that the West
was the source of moral decay in Iran. A
cleric named Ruhollah Khomeini best put
feeling into words: “the dishonorable act of
unveiling… inflicted moral and material
damage on our country and is forbidden by
the law of God and the Prophet”.24 The 1936
law, then, did two things: first, the Shah’s
dismantlement of female civic society and
the women’s spaces compounded with the
social reality of Iran at the time, where the
veil was understood as natural, moral, and
religious, led to the exclusion of a large
majority of Iranian women from the public
sphere. Second, the law reinforced
underlying assumptions about the immorality
of the West and the connection between such
immorality and women’s emancipation. It
did not achieve legitimate gender equality.
The law’s failure can be read as a failure of
Western-style humanism to justify the
perceived immorality of unveiling; that is, the
law failed precisely because it imitated
Western norms. A similar pattern emerged in
later years, as Reza Shah’s son, Mohammed
Reza Shah, pursued female suffrage in 1963.
In the years following the 1936
unveiling law, Iran was wracked by various
political and social events: World War Two
brought foreign dominance to Iran; Reza
Shah was deposed, his son, Mohammed Reza
Shah, was installed; the early fifties saw the
rise of a populist, democratic nationalist in
the form of Mohammed Mossadeq, who was
promptly ousted by a cadre of royalists and
CIA agents. In the wake of the Mossadeq
affair, Mohammed Reza Shah began to

consolidate his own political power,
developing a brutal internal intelligence
service, SAVAK, and tightening his grip over
Iran. Mohammed Reza Shah also worked to
extend his father’s program of Western-style
modernization, and in 1963 instituted a series
of reforms, known as the White Revolution,
which included female suffrage among its
provisions.25
The 1963 White Revolution was,
without a doubt, a deeply significant moment
for women’s history in Iran. The legal gains
made through the Revolution represented a
leap forward in terms of women’s political
and legal recognition in Iran. This said,
despite the Revolution’s positive effects, the
enactment of female suffrage failed to alter
social conceptions of women’s emancipation
as an immoral encroachment by the West into
Iranian society.
In January 1963, specifically in
response to American “reform pressures” 26,
Mohammed Reza Shah announced that he
would put to referendum a six-point program
of social reform, entitled the White
Revolution, which included the extension of
the right to vote to women. The Pahlavi
government’s connection to the United States
was well recognized in Iran at the time. 27
Unsurprisingly
then,
the
clerical
establishment was vehemently opposed to the
White Revolution and the referendum,
calling its supporters “the enemies of
Islam,” 28 yet again invoking a connection
between Westernization and destruction of
traditional, Islamic society. Clerical
opposition was, ostensibly, tied to issues of
dictatorship and “subservience to Western
Powers.” 29 However, one would be remiss
not to acknowledge the importance of
women’s suffrage as a point of contention
among Iranian clerics at the time: just a year

24
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before the Revolution was launched,
Ruhollah Khomeini had privately warned the
prime minister that “the franchise of
women… is contrary to Islam.”30 Despite the
opposition, the referendum, “like most such
referendums” 31 at the time, passed with a
massive majority. 32
The rather explicit merging of
subservience to the United States and
women’s suffrage incensed the religious and
traditional sectors of society. In a further
response to the passage of the White
Revolution, Khomeini began to preach
against the Shah, instigating a protest
movement that “included thousands of clergy,
shopkeepers, office workers, teachers and
students.” 33 The Pahlavi regime responded
violently, leading to the death of hundreds of
individuals. 34 While it was claimed that a
majority of Iranians supported the White
Revolution, a sizable and broad swath of
society, clearly, did not. The discourse of
modernization that the Pahlavi regime
championed, once again, was unable to
engender public support or challenge
religious discourse that held women’s
suffrage to be “contrary to Islam”. Thus,
while the White Revolution did secure
women’s suffrage, it did so at the cost of
alienating large amounts of the population
and cementing the connection between
women’s emancipation, immorality, and the
West in the minds of ordinary Iranians.
By the waning years of the Pahlavi
dynasty, political action had failed to achieve
wide social acceptance of women’s
emancipation or legitimate social equality.
These failures were primarily discursive:
Iranian women’s action had been structured
within a secular, humanist discourse, inimical
to traditional society, which was further
compounded by the efforts of the Pahlavis

elder and junior to tie female emancipation to
their program of modernization and
Westernization. Specifically, the 1936
unveiling law and 1963 White Revolution
both used women’s emancipation as a tool
towards greater Westernization of society.
Thus, in a sort of self-perpetuating cycle,
emancipatory political action under the
Pahlavis failed to create legitimate equality
because it was considered intimately tied to
the West and at the same time served to
further the conception of emancipation as
corrupting, immoral, and Western. This
concept was perhaps best captured by Jal
Ale-Ahmad’s popular and influential essay,
Gharbzadegi, which viewed the end-result of
the Pahlavis’ emancipatory politics as the
gharbzadegi, or Westoxicated, woman: a
“super-consumerist” who was a “propagator
of the corrupt culture of the West”; a culture
which was actively “undermining the moral
fabric of society.” 35 But, precisely because
the clerical establishment saw the Pahlavisupported emancipation of women as
immoral and dangerous, when the
opportunity arose for revolutionary action,
Islamists chose to champion the cause of
“true” women’s rights, dramatically altering
the valence of women’s political action
during and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
In 1978, widespread, anti-Shah
protests erupted across Iran. The protests,
which quickly evolved into a full-scale
revolution, involved the large and active
participation of women. In fact, up to a third
of the demonstrators in the revolution were
women;36 a figure made more impressive by
the fact that many of the demonstrations and
protests numbered in the millions. 37 While
leadership of the revolutionary movement
was confined, generally, to radical, Islamist,
men, like Khomeini (who had, by the time of

30
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the revolution, come to be known as
Ayatollah Khomeini) women were free to
participate in any other aspects of the struggle
that they wished to take up. Women took part
in both peaceful and violent protests; dug
trenches, fought in street battles; and joined
guerrilla movements, strikes, and boycotts. 38
Perhaps most importantly, women acted as a
motivational foundation to the greater
revolutionary movement: supporting friends
and family; working as doctors and nurses;
cooking; and spreading “oppositional
literature and tapes.”39 Women, from the start
of the revolution, were active in nearly all
levels of the public landscape of protests and
demonstrations.
As the revolution continued,
women’s participation increasingly came to
represent an Islamist view. This happened for
two reasons. First, as the revolutions
proceeded, “those opposed to the shah’s
regime increasingly saw as bad everything
the regime saw as good.”40 The regime had
long championed secularism, Westernization,
and modernization. Logically, to register
opposition to the regime and its immoral
politics, women chose to embrace Islam and
traditionalism. Second, secular, leftist, or
otherwise moderate revolutionary elements
refused to take up the question of women’s
rights “because of its association with the
policies of the Shah’s regime.”41 But radical,
Islamist elements, precisely because they
considered women to be “victims of the
Shah’s [immoral] regime,” 42 believed they
had the duty of advancing women’s true
interests. Islamists explicitly pointed to
“women as the source of change within
society.” 43 Thus, women increasingly chose
to don the chador and hijab,44 which became
the physical symbol of the rejection of

Pahlavi values, in effect transforming
religious garb into powerful, anti-Shah
political symbols. Female activists during the
revolution, then, were both voicing anger
with the Western, corrupting, and immoral
gender policies of the Shah and pragmatically
aligning themselves with the only
revolutionary elements, Islamists, who
promised to further women’s rights and
gender equality.
The result of the alignment between
Islamists and women was profound: women
were lionized and their political participation
sanctioned as divinely moral by the highest
organs of the Shii’a establishment. Islamist
leaders unconditionally approved of
women’s participation in the revolution;
Khomeini called women’s involvement “one
of the blessings of [the revolutionary]
movement”, 45 and exclaimed that women
were serving the revolutionary cause in a
manner that exceeded that of men. 46 The
Islamists transformed female political action
from its pre-revolutionary construction as
Western and immoral, into a decidedly moral,
Islamic act. The effects were immediately
obvious: during the revolution, large
numbers of women “disobey[ed] their
husbands and fathers on political grounds,”47
left the house, and felt able to mix and
demonstrate
politically
alongside
revolutionary men. The reconstruction of
female political action as moral, though, had
much farther reaching consequences: it
allowed women to challenge gender
oppression within a discourse that the new,
post-revolutionary Islamic Republic had to
engage with; that is, sanctification of
women’s political action as Islamic meant
that emancipatory women, unlike in the
Pahlavi days, could access a religious and
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traditional discourse that resonated with the
population and government and which could
not be brushed aside as Western or corrupt:
women’s political action was, as Khomeini
had decreed during the revolution, entirely
moral.
Immediately following the ouster of
the Shah, Khomeini and other Islamists
carefully purged the new Republic of all
secular opposition. In a series of impressive
political moves, Khomeini took power;
clerics, for the first time, were in control of
both
the
religious
and
political
establishments of Iran. Paradoxically, the
result of clerical control over political
structures was the creation of a constitution
that represented a “total reversal of the
history of clerical opposition to women’s
participation in the economy, politics and
society.”48 To retain the large, female support
it had enjoyed during the revolution, the new
Islamist regime enshrined women’s right to
political participation in the Islamic republic.
However, within several years the regime’s
professed commitments to gender equality
were severely curtailed.
Immediately following the institution
of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the new
government walked back its apparent
commitment to women during the revolution,
instituting mandatory hijab; purging secular
women from government; and reinstituting
shari’a with regards to family law. 49 The new
regime, though, had, in the constitution,
enshrined women’s right to political
participation; Khomeini could not ignore the
legal and moral space women now occupied
in the public, political sphere. Thus, Islamist
women, faced with the regressive gender
policies which the Islamic Republic was
championing, were able to engage the

religious establishment of the state in
dialogue,
presenting
“female-centered
interpretations of Islam;” 50 advocating for
woman-friendly laws. The state, to remain
credible as both the political and religious
supremacy in Iran, had to respond; cite
authoritative religious and legal sources;
offer rationalizations and proofs. 51 In doing
so, the state and Islamist women created what
legal scholar Louise Halper calls a “process
of public engagement,”52 a national dialogue
with which the Islamist regime was required
to engage to remain credible as a religious
and political authority. This national dialogue
further legitimized the political actions of
Islamist women.
The result of this public engagement
was a slew of successes for Iranian women.
Due to the political agitation of Islamist
women, by the early 1990s, “restrictive
barriers to women’s educational achievement
and their employment were removed;” 53
regressive family laws were repealed and,
surpassing any laws of the Pahlavi regime, a
new law to compensate divorced wives for
housework, was passed.54 Bolstered by their
political successes, Islamist women in the
early nineties began to build a formalized,
feminist exegesis of the Quran.
Islamist women, making use of the
moralized space that the Islamic Revolution
opened for female political actors, built a
movement that can be described as “Islamic
feminist.” 55 This movement was primarily
promulgated through a single female
publication: Zanan, a popular women’s
magazine.56 Zanan hosted a mix of articles
concerning “religion, culture, law, and
education,” 57 but by far the most important
topic it has covered with regards to feminism
is that of ijtihad, independent reasoning and

48

53

49

54

Paidar, 257
Halper, 110
50
Halper, 112
51
Halper, 120
52
Halper, 120

12

Moghadam, 1140
Halper, 100
55
Moghadam, 1140
56
Moghadam, 1144
57
Moghadam, 1144

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2018

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol2/iss4/1

12

et al.: Full Issue

the right to reinterpretation of the Quran.
Islamic feminists rely on ijtihad, a common
practice among Shi’a mullahs, to advance a
“feminist rereading of the sacred texts.”58 In
doing so, Islamic feminists draw upon the
explicitly religious and moralized public
space that the revolution created, engaging
with the discourse of Islam that the revolution
brought to Iran. More importantly, though,
reinterpretation of the Quran represents a
radical reclaiming of what was once a system
of oppression. In reclaiming the Quran,
Islamic feminists assert the goals and needs
of women in Iran while also remaining within
the bounds of their faith. Islamic feminism,
then, is both a rejection of the Western values,
so despised during the Pahlavi years, and a
rejection of Orientalist constructions of the
Islamic woman as utterly oppressed and
lacking agency. It is an entirely indigenous
form of feminism, owned and articulated by
Iranian women.
Beginning with the Tobacco Boycott
and Constitutional Revolution of 1905 until
the early 1990s, women and the politics of
gender have been on the forefront of the
Iranian national consciousness. In the
Tobacco Boycott and Constitutional
Revolution, women first demonstrated
political
and
organizational
power.
Unfortunately, the two events also catalyzed
clerical opposition to women’s rights as an
immoral and corrupting Western influence
that had no place in Iran. Thus, despite their
valiant efforts, women were not given an
equal treatment in the constitution of 1906.
Further efforts to emancipate women came as
part of a state-controlled march towards
Western modernity during the Pahlavi
dynasty. Both Pahlavis, elder and junior,
believed that the appearance of women’s
emancipation was necessary in order to
achieve a desired, Western modernity in Iran.
However, Reza Shah Pahlavi’s unveiling law
served to alienate the vast majority of Iranian

women, as well the country’s clerical
establishment, from the regime’s goal of
Western modernity, while concurrently
dismantling all arms of the independent
women’s movement in the country—
isolating women in their homes and barring
them from public participation. Likewise,
Mohammed Reza Shah’s 1963 White
Revolution, of which women’s suffrage was
a crucial component, brought harsh clerical
opposition, in part due to the widely
understood catalysis of the White Revolution
from Western pressure. The end result of the
Pahlavi attempts at modernization was both
the construction in the public imaginary of
the Westoxicated 59 woman, a corrupt woman
who was destroying the moral and material
fabric of Iranian society, and the
galvanization of the clerical establishment to
redefine women’s political participation in
Islamic terms during the 1979 revolution.
The Islamic Revolution of 1979
opened new allowed women to engage with
traditional Iran within a common, religious
discourse. During the revolution, women’s
political participation was encouraged by
Islamist revolutionaries. Despite earlier
opposition to women’s suffrage and political
participation, during the revolution clerical
leaders sanctioned female participation as
moral and divine. After the revolution, the
Islamic government had to engage with
religious, political women precisely because
it had already approved of their political
identities. Thus, in the face of the eradication
of protective laws, women were able to
advocate for themselves and push through
procedural and legal changes that afforded
them rights equal to those under the Shah by
1992.
The lionization and approval of
women’s political and religious action in
post-revolutionary Iran allowed some women
to engage in a constructive reinterpretation of
the Quran throughout the early 1990s. This
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new, feminist exegesis posited that the Quran
is a living text, which can and should be
understood through a temporal lens, allowing
for the development of what some scholars
have called an “Islamic feminism,” or a
feminism that holds as crucial its connection
to religion.
References
Abu-Lughod, Lila. “Do Muslim Women
Really Need Saving? Anthropological
Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its
Others.” American Anthropologist 104, no.
3 (September 2002): 783–90.

Halper, Louise. “Law and Women’s Agency
in Post-Revolutionary Iran.” Harvard
Journal of Law & Gender 28, no. 85 (2005):
85–142.
“How Iranian Women Dressed In The 1970s
Revealed In Old Magazines.” Bored Panda.
Accessed December 7, 2016.
http://www.boredpanda.com/iranianwomen-fashion-1970-before-islamicrevolution-iran/.
Keddie, Nikki R. Modern Iran: Roots and
Results of Revolution. Yale University
Press, 2006.

Ahmadi, Fereshteh. “Islamic Feminism in
Iran: Feminism in a New Islamic Context.”
Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 22,
no. 2 (December 13, 2006): 33–53.

Moghadam, Valentine M. “Islamic
Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a
Resolution of Teh Debate.” Signs 27, no. 4
(Summer 2002): 1135–71.

Axworthy, Michael. Revolutionary Iran.
Oxford University Press, 2013.

Paidar, Parvin. Women and the Political
Process in Twentieth Century Iran.
Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Derayeh, Minoo. Gender Equality in Iranian
History: From Pre-Islmanic Times to the
Present. Edwin Mellon Press, 2006.

14

Vakil, Sanam. Women and Politics in the
Islamic Republic of Iran: Action and
Reaction. The Continuum International
Publishing Group, 2011.

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2018

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol2/iss4/1

14

et al.: Full Issue

Syria: Effects of
War &
Resettlement
on Childhood
and Education
MADELINE CAHUE
Abstract
This paper addresses the negative impacts
that the current crisis in Syria has had on
childhood and education. The research
conducted for this paper is a compilation of
scholarly articles, books, reports, and films;
the diversity allows for a multiplicity of
perspectives on the topic. A thorough
background is provided as the groundwork
to understand the shift from development to
retrogression in Syria. An analysis of the
diversity of effects include: educational,
social, psychological, emotional, and
personal. Research includes the
interventions, conducted by both
international and national actors, of
schooling and social integration within and
outside of the Syrian borders. In thoroughly
analyzing the way violence influences the
accessibility and quality of schooling that a
child receives, as well as the way
resettlement and integration impact a child,
it is concluded that the current interventions
do not suffice.
Key Terms
Asylum seekers: refugees who seek
to remain in the country to which they flee
IDP: internally displaced persons;
individuals forced to leave certain parts of

15

their country and who are now displaced
within their own borders
Refugee: those who are forced to
leave their homeland, or who leave
involuntarily, out of fear for personal safety.
Childhood: a stage of development
often characterized by play and school; a
period of time where children are still
“innocent;” a stage that can be redefined by
circumstances, such as war and violence
Ba’ath: the ruling political party in
Syria
Bashar al-Assad: President of Syria
Militarization: began in response to
the regime’s brutal response to protests,
resulting in the increased violence present
today
Political Islam(ists): Muslims who
are politically active and who believe that a
Muslim government is the only way to rule
al-Qaeda: Islamist militant group;
cellular, terrorist organization that focuses
on local/national conflicts to the degree that
they are manifestations of a global struggle
ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria;
jihadist militant group
Free Syrian Army: FSA; composed
of defectors from the Syrian army who are
fighting against the regime
Aleppo: city in Northern Syria that
has become a site of conflict
Refugee Camps: camps in receiving
countries where refugees can settle prior to
obtaining legal status or settling in future
homes; services such as medical aid and
schooling are offered and organized
typically by INGOs and local NGOs
Resettlement: the process by which
refugees have sought asylum and are
relocated and admitted to a state different
from their own for permanent settlement
(Re) integration: the social process
by which refugees transition/assimilate into
the receiving country and into “normalcy”
Lost generation: the younger
generation of Syrians who are maturing
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during the heightened conflict and who bear
the greatest burden of the conflict
Political quietism: opposite of
political Islam; withdrawing from political
affairs because of religion
Introduction
This paper is on Syrian children and the
effects of the war on the educational system.
Syria’s education system has undergone
reform and many crises over the past
seventy years, including but not limited to:
reforms in curriculum, consolidation, war,
and destruction. The impacts of the reforms
and crises have clearly inhibited the
development of Syria’s educational
structure. Additionally, within the past
decade, because of the instability that has
festered within Syria, the educational
services have all but halted. The little
schooling that is available to the Syrian
children is high risk and of low quality.
Over 50% of the children in the population
are not receiving any sort of education.
Without quality schooling, any chance of
reaching full potential and creating a sense
of normalcy is not possible. This increases
the likelihood that these children will
become a “lost generation,” or a generation
that cannot self-actualize because of its
unstable circumstances. The resettlement
process in Syria and outside countries has
also influenced the children who are trying
to (re)integrate into society, while also
experiencing social, psychological, and
emotional tolls that the crisis has imposed
on them. Fortunately, there are several
different interventions underway mostly run
by relief groups, umbrella organizations,
volunteers, and school systems in the new
countries, etc. However, when the war ends
60

Mansel, Philip. Aleppo: The Rise and Fall of
Syria's Great Merchant City. London: I.B. Tauris &
Co. Ltd, 2016.
61
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more intervention will be needed for the
purposes of rebuilding the country.
In this paper, I will be discussing the effects
that the current conflict and resettlement
processes have had on Syrian children. My
research is based on the question of: how the
legal status of an individual affects her/his
access to education and childhood
experience, specifically when they are
within or from an area of conflict. This
paper will provide sections on the
background, findings, and discussion of my
research question.
Background
Syria’s History of a Nation and Education
System
The background to the Syrian conflict in
relation to this paper begins in the 20th
century. The Post-Mandate Period, which
lasted from 1944-1963, was characterized by
mass mobilization and nationalism. In
January of 1944 Syria gained independence
from the twenty-years of the French
Mandate rule. However the French troops
who were occupying Syria at the time did
not leave until April of 1946. 60
Syria’s Golden Years follow the France’s
departure. The 1950s were filled with
economic reforms where the elite class
flourished, while the poor grew more
disgruntled. Aleppo became a center for
tourism; the city was characterized by the
increasing wealth and status of those who
visited.61 In terms of the political landscape,
a landlord-merchant class dominated
Syria.62 The Syrian Golden Years also
included reforms driven by nationalism.
These reforms concerned the educational
system and were specifically geared towards
a “nationalization” of education, a spirit that
62
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began during the Post Mandate Period. In
1957, the Syrian government began taking
control of the private schools. Private
establishments could no longer appoint their
own administrators and teachers nor could
they set their tuition costs. The government
moved towards collapsing the private sector
into the public school sector arguing that the
private schools needed to start bearing the
costs of education. Following the increased
control came the resignation of many of the
original administrators and staff in the
private school sector resulting in an increase
in the government’s control. Evidently, this
rise of government control, as well as the
development of Syria’s economy were
beneficial or “glorious” for Syria, but these
years ended and there was an emergence of
a new Syria that came after. 63
Ba’ath Emergence
In 1963, the Ba’ath Party gained power
following a “bloodless coup” (Abboud
2016). The Post-1963 era was characterized
by revolution, regime preservation,
socialism, consolidation, and social
mobilization. The Ba’ath Party was
composed of civilian and military officers.
The regime had the goal of radical social
transformation. As the regime developed,
Hafez Assad emerged; his rule was
characterized as authoritarianism. Assad
took control of all institutions minimizing
political freedoms for the socially
disadvantaged. The regime was run as a
dynastic dictatorship, beginning with
President Hafez al-Assad. They made an
introduction to social welfare; however, it
was only in exchange for political quietism.
Additionally, the Assads promoted
secularism. This exemplifies the way in

which the regime was looking to control
every sector of society in order to strengthen
its connection to the state. 64
Education Reforms
In Syria, basic or primary education is a
total of nine years, divided in two cycles. It
is followed by secondary education, which
lasts a total of three years. Post-Secondary
education ranges between one and six years
depending on the type of schooling, be it
vocational school or doctoral school. The
following graph outlines the division of
schooling in Syria.

63
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Alayan, Samira, Achim Rhode, and Sarhan
Dhouib. The politics of education reform in the
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64
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In 1975, curriculum modifications began
within the Ministry of Education in Syria,
ranging from changes in curriculum to
extending compulsory education. In the
1990’s, an amending of each grade
curriculum (within primary & secondary
education) began. The amending process
consisted of changing the curriculum at an
average of one grade per year for grades 112.65
In 1981, education became compulsory for
ages six to twelve. In 1997, the Ministry of
Education added information sciences and
foreign language to the curriculum. 66
In 2000, Bashar al-Assad assumed power,
followed by a multitude of economic
reforms motivated by neoliberalism in the
attempt to create a social market economy.
Alayan et al., The politics of education reform in
the Middle East: self and other in textbooks and
curricula.
66
Ibid.
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The premise of this type of economy is “to
achieve social welfare through increasingly
privatized and marketized mechanisms...
[and] to rebalance public/private sector
authority to encourage private business
interests to play a larger role in the
economy.”67
Reforms in 2001 consisted of extending the
amendment of compulsory education from
ages six to twelve to ages six to sixteen. An
additional regulation required students who
were finishing their basic education to take
an exam whereupon passing, they would
obtain a certificate. 68 The exam results and
the certificate were meant to help students
determine whether they should continue
their education at a general secondary school
or a vocational secondary school. 69
Further regulations were imposed on private
schools in 2004. The Syrian government
required they use the same textbooks that
were used within the public school sector as
a way of ensuring that the private schools
did not develop at a faster rate than the
public.70 This regulation limited the private
schools’ overall development and serves as
an example of the increasing governmental
control over all institutions. This regulation
also explains why only 3% of all primary
schools in Syria are private and why only
6% of all secondary schools are private. 71
Consolidating the private school sector,
increasing control in institutions, and
promoting a more sectarian society in Syria
are all factors that contributed to the uproar
in 2011.
Syrian Spring
Increased tensions could no longer be
suppressed and conflict in Syria began. The
turmoil cannot be attributed to one single

factor, but rather by a buildup of several
different causes. Economic dislocation, the
spread of the Arab Spring, historical
suppression of political opposition, inflation,
and a culture of fear are all factors that
increased tension and political disgust for
the state of Syria. 72
In February of 2011, the protests in Syria
began in Dar’a after the arrests and
detention of fifteen middle school-aged boys
spray painted, “the people want the downfall
of the regime” on their school building. This
phrase was the slogan for the Arab protests,
serving as a symbol of political opposition.
The regime detained the boys as a way of
continuing their political suppression of
opposition. As a response, Syrians took to
the streets in protest. The movement gained
momentum and by mid-March, it consumed
much of Syria.73
Division of Protesting Groups
Initially, the movement was rather
disorganized and disconnected. Protestors
came from several different social and
political backgrounds making it difficult for
all of them to come together. Members of
the secular, educated, and urban middle
classes were heavily involved in the media
and publicizing the protests. Kinship based
networks or tribes were usually
socioeconomically disadvantaged. These
members were motivated by their social
exclusion from the Ba’ath party; however,
their strategy was unclear. Some tribes
joined the regime, while others joined the
opposition. Another group was made of
political Islamists divided into several
groups like ISIS, an-Nusra, and the Muslim
Brotherhood. Additionally, the Free Syrian
Army that formed is a more localized

67
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version of this group of protestors in that it
consisted mainly of the local defectors of the
regime’s army. A group of political and
social activists also rose in opposition of the
regime. Lastly, a group of the unemployed,
marginalized, and urban subalterns
protested. This group shared the
socioeconomic and political grievances as
other protestors, specifically because their
disadvantages led them to experiencing the
worst grievances first-hand.74
Collaboration
Despite the vast differences between these
groups, they were able to organize and
collaborate after they realized their common
demands. These demands included a regime
change, a new security apparatus, the
resignation of al-Assad, an independent
judiciary, and a new constitution. In having
common demands, the protests became
stronger, leaving the regime feeling
threatened. As a result, the regime
responded with repression. Their brutality
led to the detainment and killing of
protesters which in turn sparked the
militarization of the movement. This
trajectory led to the retreat of the Assad
forces, which left Syria in the hands of rebel
groups, gangs, and tribes. This fall of Syria
provided an opportunity for the politically
Islamist group, al-Qaeda, to take control.
Groups like an-Nusra and ISIS joined forces
with the long- suppressed political Islamists
of Syria. The entry of these extremist and
militarized groups contributed to the
escalation of violence that has led Syria to
its current situation.75

and had an open discussion and opportunity
to write letters to local legislation regarding
the crisis in Syria. Following the event, I
returned home where I began my research.
As I collected sources, I searched for those
that would be most helpful to answering my
research question, but also that were in the
context of how the history and crisis in Syria
can be looked at through the perspective of
education, globalization, and childhood. My
sources ranged from articles in journals
focused on education or current issues, to
books focused on the history of Syria, to
anthologies on globalization, to media or
video sources on Syria.
After collecting these resources, I began to
analyze it all and categorized them by
“history,” “education,” and “interventions.”
Within these categories, I have formed
subcategories including nation’s history,
educational history, education reform and
systems, current events, interventions within
educating children, resettling families, and
reintegrating individuals.

Methodology
Research for this project began in early
March and was inspired after attending an
event on campus. This event showed a
Frontline movie titled “Children of Syria”

Findings
When the conflict first began, many schools
were still running and safely accessible.
However, due to the rise in violence,
damage to buildings, and increased
displacement of students and teachers, the
educational crisis became dire. Specifically,
the infrastructural damage of school
buildings has left the students who are still
within borders with nowhere to go. A study
performed in 2014 by the Syrian Center for
Policy Research concluded that 25% of all
schools stopped functioning, 600 were
converted into IDP shelters, and 4,600 were
completely destroyed. By the following
year, an estimate of half of all school-aged
children were no longer attending,
approximately 3 million students.76 This
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number does not include refugee children,
but it does serve as an example of how an
entire Syrian generation is at risk.
Fragmentation and Deprivation
The Syrian conflict is generational, affecting
the younger generations the most, both those
in and out of the country. The conflict’s
impact on education deprivation (within
Syria) mirrors the fragmentation of the
country. Northern cities like Aleppo and
Raqqa are experiencing heavy levels of
violence, while cities in the South are
regime-controlled, such as Damascus and
Homs. Consequently, regime-controlled
areas are less likely to have levels of
violence as high as the northern cities, which
allows for safer environments and
accessibility to education. Attendance rates
in the North are estimated to be at 26-36%,
while attendance rates in the South have
increased. IDPs are drawn to the South to
seek refuge, due to the lower violence rate
and greater accessibility of services. The
attendance rates demonstrate a strong
correlation between the intensity of fighting
and access to education. However, the rates
also bring about another issue. While
attendance rates are increasing in the South,
the quality of education is decreasing.
Greater population densities decrease the
quality of social services available.
Moreover, while IDPs are drawn to safer
areas in the South, families are less likely to
enroll their children in schools in fear that
they will have to leave and find refuge
elsewhere.77 Another preventative factor in
school enrollment in conflict areas is that
“[students] are now specifically being
attacked and centers of learning have gone
from being incidental victims to

battlegrounds,” believing that streets are
safer than schools.78 The deprivation of
schooling that students face puts them far
behind, making it difficult to find motivation
to return to school when the opportunities
comes, thus increasing the lost generation.
Effects on the Psyche
Not only has the war effected standard
education, but it has also influenced
personal childhoods. Children who live in
war-torn areas of Syria, or experienced it
prior to resettlement, have sustained social,
psychological, and emotional effects that are
lasting. Examples include cases of PTSD,
depression, anxiety, and sleep deprivation.
Additionally, children are forced to mature
at an accelerated rate while living amongst
so much destruction and change. The
accelerated maturation tears a child’s
innocence away, as they do not live in safe
zones where playing and attending school
are possible. Instead, children are living in
fear. Studies in camps have gathered groups
of children, asking how they have been
affected by the crisis. More specifically,
they were asked if they had ever
experienced feelings of depression or
thoughts of suicide to escape the atrocities
that surround them. The results of this study
showed that increasing amounts of children
had indeed contemplated these actions. They
also demonstrated a strong correlation
between exposure to violence and trauma
and symptoms of depression and PTSD. 79
Case Study: Children at risk
Another area where parents are held
accountable for effects of the war on their
children is in cases of families who are
supporting and fighting in the revolution. In
a case study done in Aleppo, a family of

77
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four (two parents, two young children)
remained in the city where the father was
fighting in the revolution, serving as an
engineer and soldier. This left the children
with no schooling and at extreme risk, as
they lived in a neighborhood that was
mostly destroyed and constantly under
attack. Oftentimes, the children would go
out carrying automatic weapons, scavenging
for necessities in abandoned homes. Hearing
explosions as they walked through the
streets, they could identify what the
explosion came from. The children would
also occasionally help their father in making
explosives. Given the circumstances of the
conflict, the role of a parent is filled with
harder decisions and actions that impact
childhoods all the more. These facts and
images are appalling and disturbing. Images
of children, whose innocence is diminishing,
walking through ruined roads, carrying
weapons rather than books, with minds
filled with fear rather than knowledge. This
defines the lost generation. In this case
study, the mother eventually resettled abroad
with her children; however, this process of
resettlement and integration was seemingly
harder, given the uniquely horrid
experiences of the children. 80
Issues of Resettlement
Children undergoing the resettlement
process in other countries are facing issues
with integration. After witnessing and
experiencing incredible human suffering,
children and families are placed in
communities where violence is not at the
forefront. As a result, children struggle with
reintegration into a normal society and
everyday life where school and play are the
focus, rather than survival. Children are
faced with reconstructing their identity and

finding what the rest of their childhood can
entail.
Interventions
Schooling: Education is being received both
in and out of the country; the interventions
within Syria have taken creative forms.
While low conflict areas are able to openly
provide schooling for children, the areas
drowning in conflict are pushed to taking a
different approach. Several makeshift
schools have been formed because of the
destruction of buildings. Teachers and
volunteers staff schools, in the form of
underground caves, tents, trailers, tents and
remaining building. The structure of
classrooms has changed significantly
because of the conflict, which has affected
the way a child views schooling. The
traditional classroom with desks, books, and
a board in the front has transformed into
children gathered on dirt floors, sharing
textbooks in the dark as a teacher attempts to
give a lesson. Additionally, an association
has been made with the fear of educating
one’s self. The classroom atmosphere is
charged with the fear that death is lurking
around the corner. Nonetheless, these
makeshift schools have served students well,
as they create a sense of normalcy for
children whose lives are filled with fear. The
schools are led by former teachers and
activists who have been present since the
beginning of the conflict, and their shared
history with the children creates a sense of
unity. In receiving schooling, a glimmer of
hope remains and childhoods are
preserved.81
The preservation of normalcy and
childhood through education does not only
occur within Syrian borders. Refugee camps
in neighboring countries have also
introduced schooling. In 2013, Jordan
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Frontline: Children of Syria, directed by Marcel
Mettelsiefen. (2016; PBS: WTTW), DVD.

Sinclair, Margaret, "Education in emergencies,"
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absorbed half a million refugees and
Lebanon absorbed 800,000. However, 56%
of Syrian children in Jordan and 80% of
children in Lebanon were not enrolled in
schools. Typically, schooling in refugee
camps is organized and conducted by
volunteers from NGOs, INGOs, and local
volunteers within the camp or region,
although not all volunteers are formally
trained. Despite any flaws, the situation is
one where having some form of school is
better than none.82
Reintegration Programs: In cases of
resettlement, children need to be
(re)integrated into society. Consequently,
schools abroad have helped in forming coop programs to help children and families
with the integration process and to decrease
the social, linguistic, and cultural gaps
experienced upon arrival. The programs
cover language learning, communal
development, multicultural inclusivity, and
therapy; educators, administrators, social
workers, and therapists create a wellfostered and safe environment for the new
students.83 Such interventions are more
likely to produce stable resettlement and to
create social support networks that
positively impact a child’s psychological
functioning.84 In Germany, this intervention
leads schools “to support a learning process
that promotes emotional maturity of
students.” 85
Programs focused on the care of students
regard them as people first. This approach
keeps in mind that students need their minds
to be cared for first, given the multitude of
negative experiences from the resettlement
process. “Because emotional and
psychological instability may affect the

cognitive development increasing their
academic challenges, emotional and
psychological well-being is a basic
condition for meaningful engagement in
learning.”86 The success of programs in
Germany comes from the practice of
fostering the well-being of their students,
ensuring proper cognitive development to
create long-term growth.
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84

Ibid.
Timm, Marco. "The Integration of Refugees into
the German Education System: A Stance for Cultural
Pluralism and Multicultural Education," JEP:
EJournal of Education Policy, 2016.
83
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Discussion
My research was inspired by “Children of
Syria” film, leaving me curious about how
the living conditions and legal status of an
individual affects their childhood and
education. Much of my research analyzes
the lives of children and families living in
and fleeing war zones. Given the sources I
have come across, my findings have
included multiple perspectives on the topic.
While some sources contain focused case
studies within a given part of Syria
following a specific group, other resources
have simply analyzed quantitative date.
Because my research on the Syrian crisis is
current, the quantitative data is constantly
changing. In spite of this, it has been
interesting to see how the numbers have
changed progressively since 2011. For
example, the number of displaced children
and children not attending school cannot be
exact for a number of reasons: there is no
efficient or accurate way of obtaining exact
numbers due to the constantly changing flow
of people, and because there is no way of
keeping track of so many individuals.
The correlation of legal status and
opportunity has come up in each resource.
Whether a student is leaving the Syrian
Sinclair, Learning for a Future: Refugee Education
in Developing Countries.
85
Timm, “The Integration of Refugees into the
German Education System: A stance for Cultural
Pluralism and Multiculturalism Education.”
86
Ibid.
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borders, or is travelling south in the country,
their status as a refugee or IDP hinders their
opportunity and access to education and a
meaningful childhood. The status alone can
put legal limitations on the individual in that
they must be accepted into the country of
resettlement. However, it can also limit a
student in that the student is living in fear
constantly. This fear can cause parents and
children to be reluctant to enroll in school;
they are fearful of the need to leave again or
potentially being targeted by Islamist
groups.
Lastly, one particularly compelling finding
is Syrian children’s motivation for obtaining
education. The desire is engrained in the
idea that education now can be used to
rebuild the nation when the war is over.
Whether the education is received within
Syria or in neighboring countries in the
West, the hope is to use that education as a
building block in developing a new Syria.
The fall of Syria as a nation will not be in
vain if education is used as a tool of
empowering refugees and IDPs.87
Conclusion
Given the current crisis in Syria and the
multitude of effects it has had on children,
interventions within education can be and
are used as tools to keep a sense of normalcy
amidst circumstances that are seemingly
heinous. The Syrian nation’s risk of losing
an entire generation to war has caused a dire
educational crisis, while also eliciting an
imperative need for the interventions in
areas such as: makeshift schools, schooling
in refugee camps, and integration programs
in receiving countries. These programs and
interventions serve as a barrier to the
ignorance, despair, radicalization, and
exploitation that Syrian children are

susceptible to because of the war. The
findings made regarding the current
interventions have revealed both positive
and negative aspects as there are several
gaps and flaws. Current interventions have
shown determined efforts in ensuring
education for children, as well as in creating
safe environments that ease the resettlement
process. However, a greater call to action
and improvements can be made in order to
fully ensure successful interventions that
guarantee a better future for the Syrian
people and the country itself.
Agenda for Future Research
As stated in above, gaps and
shortcomings are present within current
interventions. In order to meet these
shortcomings, future research would address
the different possible approaches of future
interventions, as well as necessary post-war
interventions. To begin, there is clearly a
low sense of urgency in implementing
education efficiently within refugee camps.
Much of the schooling that is organized is
rather delayed, and the training for teachers
and volunteers is rather minimal. 88 This has
created a call for greater urgency/efficiency
and quality of education implemented in
refugee camps. Assuming that when this
future research is conducted, current
interventions will have elevated to answer
this call.
Room for improvement can be found
in the need for cultural pluralism within
integration programs. Although it exists in
Germany in minute forms, a stronger bridge
needs to be built that combines both native
(Syrian) culture with host culture in order to
create a deeper sense of belonging. Future
findings might include this type of

87
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programming, considering that its current
implementation is slowly developing. 89
Another flaw can be found in the
current psychological interventions.
Although Germany currently has integration
programs addressing the psyche in place,
they need increased presence in other
countries and to be treated as higherpriority. An approach to be seen in future
research would include the implementation
of psychological interventions and
programming prior to and alongside
schooling. Adaptive systems that intersect
the social, emotional, personal, and
psychological aspects are needed so that
individuals can cultivate their childhoods
and educations. Without the proper
implementation and care for a child’s
psyche, cognitive and academic
development will be limited, as the child
experiences PTSD, depression, and anxiety,
limiting their focus and drive for academic
pursuit and success. An ideal methodology
for future research would include a personfirst approach in interventions.
An additional path for future
research would address how education is
being used as a tool of empowerment. As
noted in the Findings, education can be used
as a way to rebuild Syria after the war is
over. The country will have been left with
very little infrastructure in multiple spheres.
Therefore, the country as a whole will need
to be rebuilt structurally, politically,
economically, and socially from the bottomup. The demand for reconstruction will
require a diversity of skilled and educated
workers and professionals alike, hence the
need for education now. The lost generation
will need an education in order to become
the successful founders of a new Syria, one
united by a shared history with a common
goal of renewal.
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The
Introduction of
the Nile Perch
into Lake
Victoria and the
Resulting NeoColonial
Relationship
JARED KELLY
Abstract
The Nile perch (Lates niloticus) is often
considered one of the worst invasive species
on earth because of the damage it has done
to Lake Victoria's ecology. Recently
however the fish has been used as an export
product and has become a significant source
of revenue for fishing communities in the
Lake Victoria Basin. The aim of this paper
is to evaluate the introduction of the Nile
perch into Lake Victoria through a political
ecology perspective. In this paper we
observe who the winners and losers are as a
result of Nile perch introduction. The Nile
perch has led to economic development
however it has keep countries in the Lake
Victoria Basin at the mercy of countries in
the Global North most notably Europe
leading to the continuation of a neo-colonial
90

The natural range of the Nile perch consists of
Africa’s lakes: Turkana, Volta, Maryut, Chad, and
the rivers: Niger, Senegal, Nile, and Congo.
91
Robert M. Pringle. “The origins of the Nile perch
in Lake Victoria.” BioScience, 55, no. 9 (2005): 782785.
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relationship. The paper further examines the
implications that have resulted from the
emergence of a hybrid ecology in Lake
Victoria.
I. The Nile Perch and its Introduction
into Lake Victoria

The Nile perch (Lates niloticus)

90

grows
up to six feet in length, weighs up to 440
pounds, and has long been considered a
menace to Africa’s Lake Victoria. In 1954,
British colonial authorities under the
Uganda Game and Fisheries Department
introduced the fish into Lake Victoria with
an intention to reduce the overfishing of
tilapia, to release a fish similar to a
prehistoric species that once lived in Lake
Victoria, and to introduce a fish to prey on
haplochromines (a tribe of cichlids endemic
to eastern, northern, and southern Africa) in
an attempt to develop the fishery’s
profitability.91 The introduction of the fish
caused a variety of unintended consequences
that are seen today in the ecology of Lake
Victoria, the traditional fishing communities
of the Lake Victoria Basin (LVB), the
governments who administer Lake Victoria,
and Lake Victoria’s commercial fishery. The
Nile perch is considered to be one of the
world’s worst invasive species according to
the International Union for Conservation of
Nature (IUCN).92 Despite the negative
externalities resulting from Nile perch
introduction a class of capitalist
entrepreneurs have benefited from the
species introduction. The largest benefactors
from the introduction of the Nile perch are
businesses based in the Global North that
92

Sarah Lowe et al. 100 of the world's worst invasive
alien species: a selection from the global invasive
species database. Vol. 12. Auckland: Invasive
Species Specialist Group, (2000): 6,11
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import Nile perch at an inexpensive rate,
most notably the European Union (EU).93
This exploitation strengthens the coreperiphery relationship between Europe and
Africa. The introduction of the Nile perch in
Lake Victoria enhances economic and
political power in the Global North, while
simultaneously establishing a growing class
of people in the LVB who lose in its wake.
The individuals who are negatively affected
are those in the Global South who are
economically dependent on exporting the
fish; which has fostered an unhealthy neocolonial relationship.
The introduction and resulting trade
of Nile perch in Lake Victoria has continued
a neo-colonial relationship between the core
(Europe and the Global North) and the
periphery (Nile perch exporting countries of
the LVB). In this relationship, the periphery
is used for resource extraction, in order to
provide the core with raw goods. The core
benefits as it receives cheap whitefish
without experiencing any of the
environmental, social, or political impacts
felt by the periphery countries that export
the fish. In the periphery the emergent novel
ecology of Lake Victoria has coincided with
the rise of new social and political dynamics
for the LVB. These dynamics see greater
tensions internationally as countries compete
for a scarcer catch, and domestically as
communities dependent on the fish deal with
the reality of dwindling stocks. In the
periphery the group that faces the greatest
costs is the marginalized peoples of
traditional riparian fishing villages.

Traditional riparian fishing communities of
the LVB continue to experience malnutrition
as their food travels elsewhere to meet the
nutritional needs higher paying consumers.
The introduction of the Nile perch occurred
during an era of colonialism and its effects
today are cyclical and continue a pattern of
neocolonialism. This is seen as poverty,
malnutrition, dependency occur in the
periphery to serve and benefit the markets in
the core with more capital.

93

95

Andrew Muhammad. "Importer Oligopsony Power
in the EU: The Case of Tanzanian Chilled Fillet
Exports.” Southwestern Economic Review 35 (2011):
164.
94
Richard Ogutu-Ohwayo. "Reproductive potential
of the Nile perch, Lates niloticus L. and the
establishment of the species in Lakes Kyoga and
Victoria (East Africa)." Hydrobiologia 162, no. 3
(1988): 193.

27

II. The Changing Ecology of Lake
Victoria
The introduction of the Nile perch
into Lake Victoria radically altered the
lake’s ecology. The ecology of Lake
Victoria is drastically changed, as
extinctions resulting from the Nile perch
have perilously reduced the biodiversity of
the lake. The Nile perch is a near-top level
predator where the only effective measure to
limit to population growth is through human
controls. The Nile perch is so successful
because it is a prolific breeder, with females
producing up to 16 million eggs per year.94
This rapid rate of reproduction has
fundamentally altered the trophic web of the
world’s second largest freshwater lake.95 It
is estimated that the haplochromine biomass
of Lake Victoria was reduced from 80% of
the lake’s total to less than 1% of the lake’s
total biomass after the introduction of the
Nile perch. It is also estimated that around
40% of the lake’s haplochromine species are

Richard O. Abila, and Eirik G. Jansen. "From local
to global markets. The fish exporting and fishmeal
industries of Lake Victoria: structure, strategies and
socio-economic impacts in Kenya." (1997): 1. (The
total surface area of Lake Victoria is 26,590 miles ² it
is split between three countries with Tanzania
possessing 49% of the Lake, Uganda 45% and Kenya
6%. It is the second largest freshwater lake in the
world by surface area behind only North America’s
Lake Superior with 31,700 miles ².)
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now extinct.96 Many authorities believe this
is the largest extinction event of vertebrates
seen in twentieth century. While the Nile
perch affected habitats for a variety of
species, trophic cascades have emerged in
the lake’s ecosystem allowing for the
proliferation of other species. The reduction
of haplochromine species reduced
competition for zooplankton allowing the
freshwater shrimp (Caridina nilotica) and
the silver cyprinid (Rastrineobola argentea)
to flourish.97 This boom in shrimp and silver
cyprinids led to a rise in aviary predators
such as pied kingfishers (Ceryle rudis).
Under a political ecology
framework, one deduces that the field of
‘invasion biology’ is built upon an
assumption that a past condition should be
restored, as the current condition is flawed.98
This lake moved towards a new equilibrium,
establishing a novel food web. Attempts to
restore Lake Victoria to an idealized past are
often misguided because it is impossible to
restore the former state of the lake due to the
extinctions which have occurred, and the
significant costs burden which would be
incurred to eliminate the Nile perch.
Furthermore, humans are not always the best
managers of nature and any attempts to
restore Lake Victoria’s past may bring about
more harm than benefit.99 This may be the
case as conservation efforts to establish a
healthy ecosystem may be detrimental to the
inhabitants of the LVB who rely on the fish
to support their livelihoods when economic

and political considerations are taken into
account.
Capitalism still makes use of the
novel ecology in order to meet Nile perch
export demand from abroad. The biggest
international importer is the Global North
and, more specifically, the European Union
(EU). In Europe, the Nile perch emerged as
a popular whitefish that replaced imports of
cod beginning in the 1980s and 1990s.
Despite its popularity, the existence of the
Nile perch leads to the depletion of smaller
fish such as the haplochromine. The
depletion of species occurs as Nile perch
consume haplochromine at rapid rates or
out-compete cichlids with pharyngeal jaws
which prey on other fish.100 This is
consequential for the traditional fishing
communities in the LVB that have long
relied on haplochromine as a conventional
source of food. Parallels can be seen
between the situation in the LVB and the
capitalist exploitation which results from the
cultivation of narcotics in tropical climates.
The cultivation of coca in Argentina,
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru serves
as cash crop which brings economic benefits
to those who produce it for export. However
the production of such drugs has the
negative externalities of driving the price of
the commodity higher which prevents the
traditional Andean cultures that have
historically used the plant from accessing it.
Furthermore the production of coca has a
tremendous ecological cost as its production
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Anthropocene." cultural geographies 20, no. 1
(2013): 4.
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Paul Robbins. “Whose Ecosystem Is It Anyway.”
University of Wisconsin-Madison. Accessed August
1, 2017.
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McGee, Matthew D., Samuel R. Borstein, Russell
Y. Neches, Heinz H. Buescher, Ole Seehausen, and
Peter C. Wainwright. "A Pharyngeal Jaw
Evolutionary Innovation Facilitated Extinction in
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(2015): 1077-1079.

Frans Witte et al. "Species extinction and
concomitant ecological changes in Lake
Victoria." Netherlands Journal of Zoology 42, no. 2
(1991): 214.
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Robert M. Pringle "From Daniel Simberloff and
Marcel Rejmánek, editors, Encyclopedia of
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results in the clearing of forests which
destroys the biodiversity inherent in native
ecosystems.101 The destruction of habitats
precludes both humans and wildlife from
accessing resources they have historically
relied on in the ecosystem.

Traditional fishing communities that
surround Lake Victoria face severe negative
externalities from the policy of Nile perch
introduction. The quality of life in these
villages declined with the depletion of the
haplochromine. Traditional fishing LVB
communities are highly susceptible to
malnutrition, and post-Nile perch
introduction saw an increase in
malnourishment rates among LVB
communities. In Kenya’s LVB region 30%
of children experienced stunted growth and
15% of children were underweight. In
Uganda the figures climb to 45.5% of
children experiencing stunted growth and
23% of children being underweight. Further
metrics are alarming as 60% of all deaths of
children under the age of five in the LVB
come from malnutrition 102 and 5.7% of
mothers at LVB fish landing sites suffered
from chronic malnourishment.103 Despite
high rates of poverty and malnourishment
individuals from these communities do not
consume Nile perch often for a range of
social and economic reasons. First there is

often a disdain for the taste of the fish as the
local communities preferred the
haplochromine that was consumed for
generations before the introduction of the
Nile perch.104 Secondly, Nile perch are
difficult to catch through traditional fishing
methods. Nile perch often destroy traditional
fishing basket traps and consume the fisher’s
catches of smaller fish.105 Other traditional
methods used such as beach fishing with
small size netting of less than 5 inches have
come under fire by LVB governments and
were banned in Tanzania in an effort to
protect juvenile Nile perch.106 The final
reason Nile perch is rarely consumed locally
is because it is too valuable to consume and
instead it is typically reserved for the export
market where it will fetch a higher price.
Nile perch is exported to meet the nutritional
needs of consumers in the Global North, and
cities in the Global South. In this scenario,
LVB communities struggle with
malnutrition while fish with the ability to
meet their nutritional requirements are
exported to people who have the ability to
pay a higher price for the fish.
Traditional fishing community needs in the
LVB are ignored by the government’s
policies. Communities with nutritional
deficiencies have resorted to fishing for
silver cyprinid, which puts a strain on the
species as immature fish have a reduced
opportunity to grow and reproduce. As a
result of this strain Kenya implemented a
yearly two-month fishing ban on silver

101
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III. The Destruction of Traditional
Riparian Fishing Villages

, Liliana M. Dávalos, Adriana C. Bejarano,
et al. "Forests and Drugs: Coca-Driven
Deforestation in Tropical Biodiversity
Hotspots." Environmental Science & Technology 45,
no. 4 (2011): 1220.
102
Diana M. Sabwa Karanja. "Health, Diseases, and
Nutrition in the Lake Victoria basin." 2006 30197
(2006): 18-19.
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Kim Geheb et al. "Nile perch and the hungry of
Lake Victoria: Gender, status and food in an East
African fishery." Food Policy 33, no. 1 (2008): 91.
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cyprinid fishing under the Kenya Marine
and Fisheries Resources Institute (KEMFRI)
with hope that stocks will rebound.107 This
ban restricts the nutritional needs of
traditional fishing communities limiting
often the only source of protein these
communities have. Organizations such as
the African Centre for Technology and
Science (ACTS) and the IUCN agreed that
current laws and policies enforced by
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda are poorly
adapted to the needs and challenges
traditional fishing LVB communities face.108
The LVB faces the highest rates of poverty
in comparison to other areas in Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda. In 1994 the Kenya’s
Welfare Monitoring Survey found alarming
rates of “hard core” poverty or a total
expenditure of less than 703 Kenyan
shillings per month (approximately $7 USD)
in the LVB.109 Hard core poverty was
between 40-50% in three Lake Basin
districts 110 and between 30-40% in four
other districts.111 The governments that
surround Lake Victoria continue to
marginalize these communities through
policies that incentivize and protect
commercial fishers. The benefits the
government receives as the result of bilateral
trade, licensing, and tax revenues from
commercial fishing come at the direct
expense of traditional fishing communities.
In order to increase the windfall from
commercial fishing LVB governments

encouraged greater mechanization such as
the use of boats with outboard motors112.
However, greater mechanization actually
leads to more poverty for LVB
communities, which is seen first-hand with
Tanzania’s neighbor, Zambia.
Zambia’s Mweru-Luapula fishery has seen
an increase of poverty within small-scale
inland fishing communities as the result of
increased catch rates and fishery
exploitation. The cause of poverty in these
communities occurs as greater
mechanization increases exploitation levels
in order to compete with largescale fishers
with advanced technological inputs. The
increased exploitation is difficult to sustain
over long periods of time especially when
the communities face greater population
pressures.113 The communities that are
deeply integrated in the fish trade do not see
economic improvement within their
communities or reductions in poverty. This
occurs because funds are reinvested in the
fishing industry rather than the community.
This leads to a lower potential for long-term
economic development as many youths
decide to forgo school to enter the fishing
industry. Despite the economic gains from
fishing sustainable structural development
has failed to occur in the LVB; the LVB
supports nearly 28 million of the poorest
rural inhabitants in the world where over 21
million people subsist on an income of
around US$ 90-270 per annum a figure less
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than the dollar-a-day rule used by the World
Bank.114 Much of the Basin lacks access to
clean running water, jobs, housing, social
services, health services, and education
which have been shown to play a decisive
role in poverty reduction. LVB communities
have become dependent on the Nile perch
fishery115 — by 2000 the Nile perch along
with two other fish the Nile tilapia
(Oreochromis niloticus) and the silver
cyprinid (Rastrineobola argentea)
constituted 99% of Lake Victoria’s total
fishery. In the LVB a monoculture has
emerged focused on the Nile perch.
Earnings from the late 1970s increased from
approximately $1 million USD to $260
million USD in 2000 with 90% of the
earnings coming from Nile perch export.116
The traditional LVB communities feel the
burden of environmental and economic
consequences as the result of Nile perch
introduction. This is because large amounts
of traditional fishing methods are banned or
are ineffective since fish stocks have been
depleted by either the Nile perch or
commercial fishers. These marginalized
communities suffer the most as a direct
consequence of Nile perch consumption
elsewhere.
IV. Commercial fishing is a losing
proposition in Lake Victoria
The industrial fisheries that profit from Nile
perch are only benefitting from the
114

Odada, Olago, and Ochola. Environment for
Development, 139.
115
Martin van der Knaap and Willem Ligtvoet. "Is
Western consumption of Nile perch from Lake
Victoria sustainable?." Aquatic Ecosystem Health &
Management 13, no. 4 (2010): 430.
116
Pringle, Encyclopedia of Biological Invasions,
486.
117
Erick Kabendera. “Tanzania lobbies Kenya,
Uganda to impose ban on fishing of Nile.” The East
African. October 18, 2014. Accessed August 3, 2017.
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Tanzania-
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profitability of their endeavors in the short
run when their policies will lead to a
fisheries collapse and a long term collapse
of the supporting food web. Commercial
fishing has blossomed into a very lucrative
industry with an economy of agglomeration
that surrounds the catch of the Nile perch. In
2014, Nile perch exports from LVB were
estimated to be $325 Million USD; and in
Uganda, fish is the country’s second biggest
export behind coffee.117 The demand for
Nile perch is increasing abroad in places
such as South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, the
Middle East, Europe, Australia, the United
States, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. In this case, it appears that the Nile
perch is a winning proposition. It is,
however, losing because large amounts of
the population and economy are overly
dependent on the fish. The Nile perch’s
profitability led to its exploitation from
overfishing and is ultimately leading it
toward its decline. Nile perch biomass
steadily decreased in August 1999 from 1.9
million tonnes (82% of Lake Victoria
Biomass) to 227,000 tonnes (14.9% of Lake
Victoria biomass) in August 2008 118 More
fishers continue to enter the market hoping
to capitalize on the Nile perch boom that
began in the 1980s.119 With the decline of
the Nile perch, a decline in the livelihoods
of individuals involved in the fishing
industry occurs. The economy of the LVB is
so dependent on fish exports that a collapse
of the fishing industry would increase the
lobbies- Kenya--Uganda-to-ban-fishing-NilePerch/2560-2490758-13dtsu1/index.html.
118
Robert Kayanda et al. "Status of the major
commercial fish stocks and proposed species-specific
management plans for Lake Victoria." African
Journal of Tropical Hydrobiology and Fisheries 21
(2009): 16.
119
Geheb et al. 2008, P.87 (In 1983 Lake Victoria
contained an estimated 12,041 fishing vessels and in
2004 Lake Victoria contained an estimated 51,712
fishing vessels.)
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region’s already staggering poverty rates
where 50% or more basin residents fall
below the their respective countries national
poverty lines.120 Many within the fishing
industry do not have a formal education and
their employment prospects outside of
fishing are limited. The other major
employment opportunity in the LVB is that
of sand mining. Sand mining has very
negative externalities including increasing
bank erosion, lake pollution, and further
harming the Lake’s fishery by destroying
fish spawning grounds.121 Lake Victoria’s
industrial fishers are at a loss because there
is very high investment in the fishery with
returns that see annual decreases. The
fisherman have secured some wealth from
the fishing boom but if the fishery collapses
there is little economic opportunities outside
of commercial fishing. Furthermore this
investment in the fishing industry has
resulted in the lost opportunity cost of
investing and developing industries in the
LVB that would have led to long term
sustainable growth.
Lake Victoria’s border countries are in a
poor position because of their involvement
with commercial industrial fisheries. The
increased competition for Nile perch
amongst a declining supply is resulting in
greater tensions amongst countries of the
LVB. This can be seen in June 2016 with
Uganda deploying its military forces to
guard its waters from foreign fishers. This

has increased tensions around the disputed
Mingingo Island with Kenya that could
potentially escalate into a greater conflict.122
Declining fish stocks have forced a response
from the East Africa Community (EAC)123
to launch the Lake Victoria Fisheries
Management Plan III (FMP III) 2016-2020.
The goal of FMP III is the “Recovery of
biomass of Nile perch with Sustainable
utilisation of fisheries resources of Lake
Victoria basin with equitable opportunities
and benefits.”124 This is a step forward, but
multilateral agreements to stop
unsustainable fishing are difficult to achieve
or are unsuccessful. FMP III has the goal to
allow the Nile perch to rebound, however it
is still not clear if this approach will be
successful. If the approach is successful, it
would continue the marginalization of the
LVB traditional fishing villages and further
destroy the haplochromine by limiting their
opportunity to rebound.125 If the Nile perch
fishery collapses, the multimillion dollar
industry it supports will follow. This will
ultimately harm the people and governments
of Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya. If
measures to preserve the fish are successful,
some of the regions most marginalized
people will continue to be oppressed as
government policies, strong commercial
fishing, and a Nile perch rebound will
suppress their traditional food sources.

Brent M. Swallow. “Improved Land Management
in the Lake Victoria Basin: Final report on the
TransVic project." World Agroforestry Centre
(2006): 1.
121
Nyakeya Kobingi et al. "Assessment of pollution
impacts on the ecological integrity of the Kisian and
Kisat rivers in Lake Victoria drainage basin,
Kenya." African Journal of Environmental Science
and Technology 3, no. 4 (2009): 97.
122
Mel Frykberg. “Ugandan military guards Lake
Victoria's dwindling fish stocks.” IOL. March 13,
2017. Accessed August 1, 2017.
http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/ugandan-militaryguards-lake-victorias-dwindling-fish-stocks-8171045.
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EAC partner countries include Kenya, Burundi,
Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania
124
“Fisheries Management Plan III (FMP III) for
Lake Victoria fisheries launched in Arusha.” East
African Community. June 28, 2016. Accessed August
1, 2017. http://www.eac.int/news-and-media/pressreleases/20160628/fisheries-management-plan-iiifmp-iii-lake-victoria-fisheries-launched-arusha.
125
Many species of haplochromine have begun to
rebound with lower number of Nile perch which
includes some species such as Neochromis simotes
that experts once believed was extinct but has now
reappeared (Balirwa et al. 2001, P. 4,22)
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V. The Winner from Nile Perch
Introduction
While there have been many who have lost
from the introduction of the Nile perch into
Lake Victoria, there are major beneficiaries
from the policy: the Global North and, most
notably, the EU. Around 80% of the Nile
perch harvest is processed and exported
primarily to Europe, Asia, Israel, the Middle
East, and the United States 126. The EU is the
primary consumer of Nile perch. In 2004,
exports to the EU totaled €190 million ($224
Million USD).127 European demand for the
fish is flexible as they can purchase
whitefish from elsewhere such as Central
Asia if Nile perch prices are too high. In this
situation, Europe has leverage to force low
prices on Nile perch exports. In order to
remain competitive fish prices are lowered,
in this situation fillets still remain too
expensive for LVB inhabitants and less
foreign money comes to the LVB.128 This
stifles the LVB’s economic development, as
there is not enough capital to develop
industries outside fishing. This directly
continues a core-periphery colonial legacy
where the core intentionally keeps the
periphery weak for its benefit.
The EU is in a unique win-win position
when it comes to the Nile perch. If the Nile
perch collapses, the EU has the ability to
claim they helped reduce the fallout from
one of the world’s worst ‘invasive’ species.
As consumer purchasing power reduced
Nile perch prevalence mitigating against the
disruption to the food web caused by the
fish. If the fishery collapses, it will buy
126

Jennifer Lee Johnson. "From Mfangano to
Madrid: the global commodity chain for
Kenyan Nile perch." Aquatic Ecosystem Health
& Management 13, no. 1 (2010): 22.
127

Helga Josupeit. The Market for Nile Perch. FAO
Globefish Research Programme, (2006): 43.
128
“Nile Perch Fillet Subsector Study In Lake Zone a
Quick Scan” SNV Netherlands Development
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whitefish from elsewhere, as it did when the
Atlantic northwest cod fishery collapsed. If
the fishery recovers, the EU has a cheap
source of whitefish and can tell the story that
they are helping the economic development
of the LVB by purchasing the fish. The
periphery does not have these options as
their dependency is evident: 90% of
Tanzania’s fish exports are Nile perch.129
This is a continuing of the core-periphery
problem where the Global North is forcing
the Global South dependency and exploiting
its resources without taking into account the
breadth of consequences Nile perch
consumption has for the LVB.
VI. Lake Victoria’s Catch-22
While Europe and the Global North have a
win-win situation, the LVB is stuck in a
catch-22. Much of the rhetoric from Global
North environmentalists is focused on the
removal of the fish because of its ‘invasive’
status. This mindset is divorced from the
reality of the situation occurring in the LVB
where many communities are dependent on
the fish. This leads to a catch-22 where the
LVB is stuck in a losing proposition no
matter what the outcome is. If the Nile perch
continues its presence in the lake, the lake
could see a decline of more fish species and
likely more extinction, further harming
marginalized LVB traditional fishing
communities. If the fish is eliminated, a
lucrative industry will collapse as the Nile
perch represents the vast market share of
fish that is exported (90%) from the LVB.
Other Lake species including silver
Organisation: Tanzania, November 2005, 7.
Accessed April 16, 2018.
http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/fileadmin/_migrated/content_
uploads/Nile_Perch_Fillet_Sub_Sector_Study_draft_
1.pdf.
129
Jennie Bergman and Sandra Vieweg. "Nile Perch
Export and Welfare around Lake Victoria-Has the
boom in exports been positive for welfare?."
(2012):7.
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cyprinids and cichlids do not have a large
export profile outside of Africa. The only
other remaining fish that is prominent in the
export market is the non-native Nile tilapia
which may face more pressure whose
population has been steadily increasing with
Nile perch declines.130 The dependency on
Nile perch monoculture and the reliance on
Global North consumption of the fish serve
as a precursor to a catastrophic situation. In
this situation large numbers of individuals
with little prospects outside fishing will lose
work and many may elect enter the sand
mining trade – which presents other
significant environmental hazards to Lake
Victoria. Governments will see a decrease in
trade and tax revenue, hampering future
development. Ultimately, the African
countries that surround Lake Victoria are in
a catch-22 with losing options, while the
Global North is locked into a win-win
situation.
VII. Conclusion
The current focus of the Lake Victoria
debate is to reduce stocks of Nile perch in
order to return the Lake to its old ecology, or
to improve Nile perch stocks continuing the
viability of commercial fishing. Both sides
are misguided as they do nothing remedy the
groups most marginalized by the policy of
Nile perch introduction. The focus does not
address the neo-colonial relationship
between the Global North and South which
is a driver of dependency, poverty,
malnutrition, lack of sustainable
development, and increased conflict among
riparian communities in the LVB. Future
debates on the subject from both the Global
North and South need to incorporate the
130

M. Njiru, J. Ojuok, A. Getabu, et al. "Increasing
Dominance of Nile Tilapia, Oreochromis niloticus
(L) in Lake Victoria, Kenya: Consequences for the
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social, political, and economic impacts
policies will have on some of the world’s
poorest rural inhabitants. Conservation
efforts designed and implemented with
ecosystem health as a primary goal should
aim to incorporate sustainable development
principles from the fishery’s wealth to
improve access to clean running water,
alternative jobs, housing, education, and
health and social services for LVB residents.
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